Rational belief structure, grounds, and intellectual virtue /
Audi, Robert (1941-....)
Rational belief structure, grounds, and intellectual virtue / [Texte imprimé] : Robert Audi - Oxford : Oxford University Press, cop. 2015 - 1 vol. (281 p.) ; 24 cm
Notes bibliogr.
Belief : its structure, content, and relation to the will -- Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe -- Doxastic voluntarism and the ethics of belief -- Belief : a study in form, content, and justification -- Normativity and virtue in epistemology -- Moral perception and moral knowledge -- Reliability as a virtue -- Knowledge, justification, and the normativity of epistemology -- Epistemological internalism and grounds of justification and knowledge -- An internalist theory of normative grounds -- Theoretical rationality : its sources, structure, and scope -- Doxastic innocence : phenomenal conservatism and epistemological common sense -- Skepticism about the a priori : self-evidence, defeasibility, and cogito propositions -- Social epistemology -- The place of testimony in the fabric of knowledge and justification -- Testimony as a social foundation of knowledge -- The ethics of belief and the morality of disagreement : intellectual responsibility and rational disagreement
978-0-19-022183-6
Belief and doubt
121
Rational belief structure, grounds, and intellectual virtue / [Texte imprimé] : Robert Audi - Oxford : Oxford University Press, cop. 2015 - 1 vol. (281 p.) ; 24 cm
Notes bibliogr.
Belief : its structure, content, and relation to the will -- Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe -- Doxastic voluntarism and the ethics of belief -- Belief : a study in form, content, and justification -- Normativity and virtue in epistemology -- Moral perception and moral knowledge -- Reliability as a virtue -- Knowledge, justification, and the normativity of epistemology -- Epistemological internalism and grounds of justification and knowledge -- An internalist theory of normative grounds -- Theoretical rationality : its sources, structure, and scope -- Doxastic innocence : phenomenal conservatism and epistemological common sense -- Skepticism about the a priori : self-evidence, defeasibility, and cogito propositions -- Social epistemology -- The place of testimony in the fabric of knowledge and justification -- Testimony as a social foundation of knowledge -- The ethics of belief and the morality of disagreement : intellectual responsibility and rational disagreement
978-0-19-022183-6
Belief and doubt
121