Testimony, trust, and authority
McMyler, Benjamin
Testimony, trust, and authority [Texte imprimé] / Benjamin McMyler - Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, cop.2011 - 1 vol. (VIII-178 p) : couv. ill. ; 24 cm
Bibliogr. p. 171-175
Testimony as a philosophical problem -- Knowing at second hand -- Three models of epistemic dependence -- Trustung a person -- Authority, autonomy, and second-personal reasons
Much of what we know is acquired by taking things on the word of other people whom we trust and treat as authorities concerning what to believe. But what exactly is it to take someone's word for something? What is it to treat another as an authority concerning what to believe, and what is it to then trust this person for the truth? Benjamin McMyler argues that philosophers have failed to appreciate the nature and significance of our epistemic dependence on the word of others
978-0-19-979433-1
Testimony (Theory of knowledge)
121.3
Testimony, trust, and authority [Texte imprimé] / Benjamin McMyler - Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, cop.2011 - 1 vol. (VIII-178 p) : couv. ill. ; 24 cm
Bibliogr. p. 171-175
Testimony as a philosophical problem -- Knowing at second hand -- Three models of epistemic dependence -- Trustung a person -- Authority, autonomy, and second-personal reasons
Much of what we know is acquired by taking things on the word of other people whom we trust and treat as authorities concerning what to believe. But what exactly is it to take someone's word for something? What is it to treat another as an authority concerning what to believe, and what is it to then trust this person for the truth? Benjamin McMyler argues that philosophers have failed to appreciate the nature and significance of our epistemic dependence on the word of others
978-0-19-979433-1
Testimony (Theory of knowledge)
121.3