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Socratic moral psychology [Texte imprimé] / Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith

بواسطة:المساهم (المساهمين):نوع المادة : نصنصتفاصيل النشر:Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010وصف:1 vol. (VII-276 p.) ; 24 cmتدمك:
  • 9780521198431
  • 0521198437
الموضوع:تصنيف DDC:
  • 170.92 21E
تصنيفات أخرى:
  • 170
المحتويات:
Machine generated contents note: Introduction; Acknowledgements; 1. Apology of Socratic studies; 2. Motivational intellectualism; 3. The 'prudential paradox'; 4. Wrongdoing and damage to the soul; 5. Educating the appetites and passions; 6. Virtue intellectualism; 7. Socrates and his intellectual heirs: Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; Appendix: Is Plato's Gorgias consistent with the other early or Socratic dialogues?; Bibliography of works cited; Index of passages; General index
ملخص:"Socrates' moral psychology is widely thought to be 'intellectualist' in the sense that, for Socrates, every ethical failure to do what is best is exclusively the result of some cognitive failure to apprehend what is best. Until fairly recently, the view that, for Socrates, emotions and desires have no role to play in causing such failure went unchallenged. This book argues against the orthodox view of Socratic intellectualism and offers in its place a comprehensive alternative account that explains why Socrates believed that emotions, desires and appetites can influence human motivation and lead to error. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith defend the study of Socrates' philosophy and offer a new interpretation of Socratic moral psychology. Their novel account of Socrates' conception of virtue and how it is acquired shows that Socratic moral psychology is considerably more sophisticated than scholars have supposed"-- Provided by publisher
نوع المادة:
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المقتنيات
نوع المادة المكتبة الحالية المجموعة رقم الطلب رقم النسخة حالة تاريخ الإستحقاق الباركود
Livre Livre Bibliothèque centrale En accès libre Collection générale 170 / 423 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) 1 المتاح 000002824949

"Socrates' moral psychology is widely thought to be 'intellectualist' in the sense that, for Socrates, every ethical failure to do what is best is exclusively the result of some cognitive failure to apprehend what is best. Until fairly recently, the view that, for Socrates, emotions and desires have no role to play in causing such failure went unchallenged. This book argues against the orthodox view of Socratic intellectualism and offers in its place a comprehensive alternative account that explains why Socrates believed that emotions, desires and appetites can influence human motivation and lead to error. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith defend the study of Socrates' philosophy and offer a new interpretation of Socratic moral psychology. Their novel account of Socrates' conception of virtue and how it is acquired shows that Socratic moral psychology is considerably more sophisticated than scholars have supposed"-- Provided by publisher

Index

Bibliogr. 259-267

Machine generated contents note: Introduction; Acknowledgements; 1. Apology of Socratic studies; 2. Motivational intellectualism; 3. The 'prudential paradox'; 4. Wrongdoing and damage to the soul; 5. Educating the appetites and passions; 6. Virtue intellectualism; 7. Socrates and his intellectual heirs: Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; Appendix: Is Plato's Gorgias consistent with the other early or Socratic dialogues?; Bibliography of works cited; Index of passages; General index

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