Opposition movements, liberalization, and civil war [Ressource électronique] : evidence from Algeria and Chile

When does bargaining between government and opposition groups turn violent? In this article, I argue that groups with cohesive, developed organizational structures are less likely to engage in conflictual behavior. Opposition movements are often divided into moderate and radical challengers, and groups without developed organizational structures cannot limit radicals' demands. The argument is supported in a comparative analysis of bargaining processes in Algeria and Chile in the late 1980s. In Algeria, the primary opposition group was marred by internal divisions and tensions between radical and moderate elements. When the party emerged victorious in democratic elections, the government feared that radical elements would soon take over, canceled election results and attempted to reestablish control by using force. Opposition parties in Chile, however, presented a cohesive and unified alternative to the Pinochet regime, which contributed to a peaceful transfer of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Civil Wars is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)