Why governments and parties manipulate elections theory, practice, and implications / [Texte imprimé] :
Alberto Simpser
- Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013
- 1 vol. (XIX-282 p.) ; 24 cm
- Political economy of institutions and decisions .
- Political economy of institutions and decisions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) .
Bibliogr. p. 245-271
Machine generated contents note: Preface: more than winning; 1. Introduction and overview; 2. Electoral manipulation: what it is and how to measure it; 3. The puzzle of excessive and blatant manipulation; 4. More than winning: the consequences of excessive and blatant electoral manipulation; 5. The strategic logic of electoral manipulation; 6. The theory at work: evidence from case studies; 7. Indirect effects of electoral manipulation: quantitative evidence; 8. Conclusion
"Why do parties and governments cheat in elections they cannot lose? This book documents the widespread use of blatant and excessive manipulation of elections and explains what drives this practice. Alberto Simpser shows that, in many instances, elections are about more than winning. Electoral manipulation is not only a tool used to gain votes, but also a means of transmitting or distorting information. This manipulation conveys an image of strength, shaping the behavior of citizens, bureaucrats, politicians, parties, unions and businesspeople to the benefit of the manipulators, increasing the scope for the manipulators to pursue their goals while in government and mitigating future challenges to their hold on power. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections provides a general theory about what drives electoral manipulation and empirically documents global patterns of manipulation"--
9781107030541
Elections / Corrupt practices Political corruption POLITICAL SCIENCE / General