000			02257nab a2200385 i 4500
001			a427283
003			SIRSI
008			197107s1971 xxu |s 000#0 eng d
009			427283
040			_aEBSCO _bfre _cEBSCO _dEBSCO _eAFNOR
043			_af-ly---
072			_aOM
082	0	4	_a338.2728209612 _221E
084			_a338.1
100	1	0	_aLevy, Walter J. _eAuteur _4070 _9292580
245	1	0	_aOil power _h[Ressource électronique]
520			_aThe article focuses on unprecedented demands on the international oil industry by major oil-producing countries since the late summer of 1970. Despite discoveries in the North Sea, Far East and elsewhere, it is clear that the Eastern Hemisphere will continue to depend decisively on OPEC oil to meet mounting oil requirements. With its surplus productive capacity largely gone, the U.S., too, will probably have to increase its oil imports. Within this context, the recent dramatic confrontations between the oil companies and the producing countries, which started in Libya last summer, assume great importance. In the short span of the 1960s, Libyan production rose from zero to almost 3.7 million barrels daily, rivaling the output of the leading Persian Gulf producing countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. The most obvious effect of the recent round of oil agreements is the striking increase in producing country revenues from $7 billion in 1970 to around $18.5 billion by 1975. Despite the great efficiency and impressive results of the international oil industry's management of its affairs in the past, the present attacks on its fundamental position make a frank analysis of past actions and future prospects utterly necessary.
650		4	_aGAZ _91261
650		4	_aPOLITIQUE PETROLIERE _92655
650		4	_aPRODUCTION _91350
650		4	_aPETROLE _91554
651		4	_aLIBYE _91551
773	0		_tForeign Affairs. - _gJul71, Vol. 49 Issue 4, p. 652-668. - _xISSN 00157120.
856	4	2	_uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/20037871
930			_a427283
931			_aa427283
990			_aEl Basri
990			_aEl Basri
035			_a949172900
856			_uhttp://www.fondation.org.ma/dsp/index/a427283-81
095			_axxu
999			_c444893 _d444893